Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday\u27s Outlawed Penalty Is Today\u27s Probation Condition by Tavill, Leonore H.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1988
Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed
Penalty Is Today's Probation Condition
Leonore H. Tavill
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Criminal Law Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland
State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Scarlet Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty Is Today's Probation Condition, 36 Clev. St. L. Rev. 613 (1988)
SCARLET LETTER PUNISHMENT:
YESTERDAY'S OUTLAWED PENALTY IS
TODAY'S PROBATION CONDITION
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 613
A. Prison Overcrowding ........................... 615
B. Alternatives to Incarceration ...................... 618
C. Probation .................................... 620
D. Probation Conditions ........................... 621
E. The Scarlet Letter Condition ...................... 624
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES ............................. 624
A. Freedom of Speech ............................. 625
B. Freedom of Association .......................... 626
C. Right to Privacy ............................... 628
D . R ight to Work ................................. 629
E. The Taking Clause ............................. 629
F. Vagueness ................................... 630
G. Cruel and Unusual Punishment ................... 631
III. CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES .............................. 634
A . E ligibility .................................... 635
B. Felony Probation .............................. 637
C. Rehabilitation ................................. 639
D . Protection .................................... 642
E. Punishm ent .................................. 643
IV. CONCLUSION ..................................... 644
I. INTRODUCTION
P risons and jails are overused and unsuccessful methods' for solving a
progressively increasing crime problem.2 Evidence of their failure is
abundant. Among other things, they are overcrowded,3 accomplish very
' This note discusses the constitutional and criminal law issues of a scarlet letter
probation condition and recommends alternative methods to incarceration. While firm
opinions have been expressed based on these issues, it is still reasonable to withhold
definitive conclusions due to the paucity of written case law.
2 See generally Frank, The American Prison: The End of an Era, 43 FED. PROBATION 3, 7
(Sept. 1979).
' See generally Armstrong, Prudent Use of Prison Space: The Sentencing Improvement
613
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
little in the way of punishment objectives, 4 and completely lack the
monetary support required to make them effective. 5 As such, incarcera-
tion can no longer be the primary form of punishment in the United
States.6 Recognizing the urgency of the situation, the judicial system has
turned to alternative sentencing as a solution.7 Today, many judges no
longer impose traditional sentences, but are creatively designing alter-
natives for offenders they deem worthy of such treatment.8 For practical
reasons, the most common alternative form of sentencing has become
probation accompanied by certain restrictive conditions.9
The use of alternatives has sparked a whole host of new issues. The
most significant of these new issues is the determination of who should or
should not receive probation' ° and what kind of probation condition can
be justified for certain criminals.1 Desperation, indefinite statutory
provisions, and the resulting judicial discretion afforded to those on the
bench has led to the imposition of some probation conditions which are
Act, 11 J. LEGiS. 237 (1984); Johnson, Our Exploding Jails, 22 JUDGES' J. 4 (1983); Lohman,
Florida's Overcrowded Prisons, 57 FLA. B.J. 199 (1983); Planchard & Pritchatt, A Systemic
Approach to Jail Overcrowding, 57 FLA. B.J. 207 (1983); Silas, Lock 'Em Up? There's No
More Room!, 69 A.B.A. J. 1351 (1983); Comment, The Eighth Amendment and State
Correctional Overcrowding: The Second Circuit Serves Up An Ounce of Prevention, 52
BROOKLYN L. REv. 647 n.1 (1986).
' See generally Biles, Crime and the Use of Prisons, 43 FED. PROBATION 39 (June 1979);
Velie, Finding New Alternatives, 98 L.A. DAILY J. 4 (Aug. 12, 1985).
' See Armstrong, supra note 3, at 239; Velie, supra note 4.
6 Frank, supra note 2, at 7.
7 See Silas, Doing Time Outside Prison, 69 A.B.A. J. 1813 (1983); e.g., 194 N.Y.L.J. 1
(Nov. 13, 1985); 98 L.A. DAILY J. 3 (Nov. 8, 1985); 194 NAT'L L.J. 1 (Sept. 10, 1985); 97 L.A.
DAILY J. 4 (Apr. 25, 1984); 6 NAT'L L.J. 12 (Apr. 23, 1984); 96 L.A. DAILY J. 4 (Dec. 28, 1983);
94 L.A. DAILY J. 4 (June 22, 1981).
7- s See, e.g., 6 NAT'L L.J. 47 (Feb. 6, 1984) (offender required to stand before church
congregation on Sunday and confess crime); 6 NAT'L L.J. 43 (Oct. 10, 1983) (offender required
to stop smoking for probation period of two years); 5 NAT'L L.J. 43 (July 18, 1983) (offender
required to read a book and write a six page report); 5 NAT'L L.J. 43 (Nov. 1, 1982) (offender
required to attend college full time for five years); 4 NAT'L L.J. 55 (May 5, 1982) (offender
required to write confessional letter to editor of local paper); 4 NAT'L L.J. 39 (Apr. 12, 1982)
(offenders ordered to host a series of happy hours at a geriatric ward of local hospital); 4
NAT'L L.J. 39 (Oct. 5, 1981) (offender ordered to have his mouth washed out with soap after
using abusive language to an officer); 4 NAT'L L.J. 39 (Sept. 28, 1981) (offender required to
offer sushi meals to senior citizens at half price for three months); 2 NAT'L L.J. 3 (Aug. 25,
1980) (doctor sentenced to heal in India for three years without compensation due to
medicaid fraud).
' BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROBATION AND PAROLE 1981 1 (Bulletin)
(1981). See generally Davis, Academic and Practical Aspects of Probation, 47 FED. PROBATION
7 (Dec. 1983); Parisi, Combining Incarceration and Probation, 44 FED. PROBATION 3 (June
1980).
10 N. COHEN & J. GOBERT, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 31-91 (1983) [hereinafter COHEN
& G OBERT].
" Id. at 185.
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unnecessarily harsh, unjustified, and possibly unconstitutional.12 Of
particular concern is the growing use of "scarlet letter" probation
conditions which require signs to be posted on the offender's property
warning the public by announcing the crime committed. 13
The use of scarlet letter punishment has the potential for turning the
hands of time back to an uncivilized era when the treatment of convicted
criminals was concerned solely with inflicting physical or mental
injury. 14 This is a barbaric and pathetically simplified answer to an
extremely complicated problem. Furthermore, it is unjustified against
even the most hardened and violent criminals, both constitutionally and
theoretically. 15 Yet because of the frustrating and desperate situation of
our criminal justice system, such punishment is becoming more fre-
quently rationalized and accepted. If the situation is allowed to continue,
it is not unreasonable to expect even more primitive punishments to
return to commonplace use.
A. Prison Overcrowding
Now may be the time to become a criminal. The likelihood of being
sentenced to prison or jail is decreasing daily.' 6 The jail and prison
overcrowding crisis, predicted by experts for more than a decade, is upon
the United States."7 Warnings unheeded by state and federal legisla-
tures, administrative authorities, and the general population have re-
sulted in a country clamoring frantically for a solution to a state prison
system operating at 110% of its capacity and a federal prison system
operating at 124% of its capacity.' 8 With the United States boasting a
higher imprisonment rate than any country in the world, except the
Soviet Union and South Africa, 19 the current prison situation has
exceeded statisticians' most extravagant expectations. 20 The situation is
12 See infra notes 117-35 and accompanying text.
13 Oregon v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. Nov. 1987). See generally 9 NAT'L L.J.
8 (Aug. 31, 1987).
14 Brief for Appellant at 25, Oregon v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. Nov. 1987).
See infra note 186 and accompanying text.
15 See infra text accompanying notes 75-193.
16 Cf. Johnson, supra note 3, at 6 ("The incarceration rate is more closely related to the
amount of space available than to any other factor.").
17 See sources cited supra note 3.
15 Thomas, Judicial Independence in Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 73 A.B.A. J. 6
(1987).
19 Armstrong, supra note 3, at 238.
20 For instance, it was projected in 1979 that the State of New York would need 4,000
new prison cells by 1986. That projection was surpassed in 1981. Similarly, in 1983, a
prediction for new cells needed within 12 months was reached in four months. That same
year it was also discovered that the overall prison population had more than doubled in the
past decade from 204,000 in 1973 to 432,000 in 1983. Further, in 1982 federal and state
prisons held 412,303 inmates which was nearly 12% more than the 369,000 held a year
1988]
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so extreme that a defeatist attitude toward the future use of jails or
prisons is quite realistic at this late date. Unfortunately, the origins of
this crisis continue, and few can escape the blame.
As crime rates continue to rise,2 1 the public, although anxious to see
more criminals incarcerated, remains uninterested in funding the con-
struction of new facilities, unsympathetic to overcrowded conditions, and
adamant that prisons should not be built in residential districts. New
construction is immensely expensive and can dominate a state's budget-
ary expenditures. Furthermore, in some states, the cost to taxpayers is up
to $35,000 a year just to house an inmate.22 In order to reflect the public's
"get tough" expectations, 23 with an eye on their re-election prospects,
many judges have taken a stronger stand toward crime and are sentenc-
ing offenders, whether violent or nonviolent,24 to jail or prison more
frequently, for longer periods, and with more stringent standards for
parole. Arrest practices and policies, pre-trial release policies and case
processing time frames are also contributory factors.25 In addition, some
state legislatures have passed new mandatory sentencing laws, further
earlier and it was more than twice the 196,000 held in 1972. The incarceration rate has
steadily increased from 79 people incarcerated per 100,000 in 1925 to 244 per 100,000 in
1981. This represents an average annual growth rate of 2.4% in the prison population while
the average annual growth rate for the general population is only 1.2%. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS AT MIDYEAR 1983 2 (Bulletin) (1983). A more
recent study conducted in 1984 discovered that the United States prison population was
growing 15 times faster than the general population. Thus, even if the rate of increase of
federal prisons remained constant, the federal government would have been forced to
construct a new prison every two months to avoid the explosive situation faced by the states.
Since this construction goal was impossible to fulfill, at least 39 states have been issued
court orders to reduce prison overcrowding-a task equally impossible to meet. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF JusTcE STATISTICS 1 (1984).
Consequently, double bunking and the use of gymnasiums, boiler rooms, and chapels as
sleeping quarters have become the norm. Call, Recent Case Law on Overcrowded Conditions
of Confinement, 47 FED. PROBATION 23 (Sept. 1983).
By comparison, the crisis in United States jails may be even more extreme. In 1982, 6.2
million people went to 3,493 jails-17 times the number of people in all federal and state
prisons. Eighty-one percent of the people in jail cells live in less than 60 square feet of floor
space per person, the minimum standard. See Johnson, supra note 3, at 6.
21 See Breed, Don't Throw the Parole Baby Out With the Justice Water, 48 FED. PROBATION
11 (June 1984).
22 Thomas, supra note 18, at 6. "For every person that goes to prison, two people don't
go to college. For every day a person stays in jail, 20 children eat starch instead of protein."
Lohman, supra note 3, at 203.
23 See Cullen, Clark & Wozniak, Explaining the Get Tough Movement: Can the Public be
Blamed?, 49 FED. PROBATION 16 (June 1985) ("[T]he Bureau of Justice Statistics (1983:1) was
quick to conclude that 'stiffened public attitudes toward crime and criminals' are 'among the
foremost factors' in escalating prison populations.").
24 "Some experts point out that 40% of America's prisoners are not dangerous to the
public." Thomas, supra note 18, at 6.
25 Planchard & Pritchatt, supra note 3, at 211.
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burdening the overworked system. 26 Jails have often taken on a social
service camouflage and become homes for the mentally retarded, juve-
niles, and public inebriates.27 Economically difficult times have placed
many in jail who may have been able to pay fines in the past but are now
without an income or savings. 28 As such, the public, state and federal
legislatures, and social or administrative agencies shoulder part of the
responsibility for the current situation and should remain accountable for
potential solutions.
These entities shoulder only part of the blame and the remainder can
be attributed to stiffened public attitudes based upon the criminal law
premise ingrained in the justice system, that incarceration lowers crime
and recidivism rates.29 Casting doubt upon this social policy, recent
studies have found little relationship between general inmate popula-
tions and total crime rates.30 Accordingly, the use of jails and prisons to
protect the general public and eradicate criminal behavior may be a
fruitless endeavor. This realization has led many to believe that building
new jails and prisons in order to alleviate overcrowding is not the solution
but only a band-aid approach to a much deeper problem. 31 Closer
examination by experts on the theoretical justifications for confinement
are exposing an increasing number of discrepancies between those
justifications and our system's success in accomplishing them.3 2
Moreover, the possible overuse of prisons and jails has led to other
unforeseen costs for state and federal governments. The recent success of
lawsuits based upon cruel and unusual punishment claims has become a
huge expense.3 3 Costs of health care are rising rapidly due to the
26 "At least 46 states have mandatory sentencing laws and 12 states have passed some
form of determinate sentencing law, both which frequently result in a longer average time
served than indeterminate sentences." Breed, supra note 21, at 11. See also Moss, Fixed
Sentencing Proposed, 73 A.B.A. J. 27 (1987).
27 Johnson, supra note 3, at 6.
28 Id.
29 See Cullen, Clark & Wozniak, supra note 23, at 16.
3' David Biles, a criminal law researcher, concludes that there is actually a positive,
rather than a negative, relationship between crime and the use of imprisonment. He
reasons that this may be due to the fact that higher crime communities feel compelled to
respond by incarcerating proportionately high numbers of offenders. Alternatively, impris-
onment itself may be criminogenic. As a result, his data clearly refutes the theory that the
greater use of imprisonment will reduce crime. Biles, Crime and the Use of Prisons, 43 FED.
PROBATION 39, 42 (June 1979); see also Sykes, Vito, and McElrath, JailPopulations and Crime
Rates: An Exploratory Analysis, 15 J. POL. Sci. & ADMIN. 72, 74 (1987) ("There is little
relationship between increasing general inmate populations and total crime rates.").
31 See generally Biles, supra note 30, at 43, recognizing that the relationship between
imprisonment and crime is much more complex than can be revealed by simple correlations.
32 See Frank, supra note 2, at 7.
a3 See generally Call, supra note 20, at 23 ("when correctional facilities become crowded
the likelihood of a lawsuit still must be considered substantial and the court's resolution of
the dispute cannot be predicted with confidence."); Comment, supra note 3, at 647 (in the
1988]
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accelerating effect that long-term overcrowding has upon the spread of
communicable diseases, heart attacks, and high blood pressure.34 Suicide
and death rates increase, inmate violence becomes commonplace, and
disciplinary control declines under crowded conditions.35 Thus, the costs
can be counted not only in dollars, but also in lives.
Nevertheless, those interested in attempting to solve a seemingly
unsolvable problem have discovered and turned to the last possible route
for a justice system which is no longer able or willing to utilize jails and
prisons. This route is what has come to be known as sentencing or prison
alternatives.
B. Alternatives to Incarceration
Fueled by the knowledge of the many shortcomings of the prison
system, judges are implementing and commentators are singing the high
praises of alternative sentences. Based upon the discretionary language
of the Federal Probation Act 36 and similar state statutes, 37 the courts
have found the authority to creatively sentence an offender. Moreover,
prominent legal organizations have recommended a statutory preference
for sentences which do not involve incarceration. 38 These alternative
sentences are usually affixed as a condition of a probationary term, as a
requirement of a suspended sentence, or as a term of a conditional
discharge from prison.3 9
The need for alternatives and the discretion awarded judges in sen-
tencing procedures have sparked a proliferation of different types of
alternative sentences. 40 Proponents of these alternatives claim that they
2d Circuit, Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1984), is predicted to increase the
potency of judicial relief available to state inmates).
14 See Thornberry & Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The
Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 313 (1983); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NATIONAL INSITIJTE OF JUSICE, THE EFFECT OF PRISON CROWDING ON INMATE BEHAVIOR 1 (1980).
31 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUsncE, THE EFFECT OF PRIsoN CROWDING ON
INMATE BEHAVIOR 1 (1980).
36 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or
life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United
States when satisfied that the ends ofjustice and the best interest of the public as
well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or
execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best. (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303 (1987); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.06 (West 1982); HAw.
REV. STAT. § 706-624 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2951.02 (Anderson 1987); TEx. CRm. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 6 (Vernon 1974); W. VA. CODE § 62-12-9 (1984).
3 See sources cited infra note 141.
3 COHEN & GOsERT, supra note 10, at 33.
4' The most popular conditions of probation are community service, restitution, and the
payment of fines. House arrest or home detention monitored through electronic devices is
(Vol. 36:613
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are "cheaper than prison terms, ease overcrowding in jails, and provide a
middle ground between the two extremes of incarceration and straight
probation."4 1 Recognition that many offenders will receive parole entail-
ing minimal supervision after only a short imprisonment further justifies
prison alternatives.42 It is also claimed that this sentencing is more
responsive to an offender's rehabilitative needs and much less disruptive
for an individual than jail.43 Moreover, alternatives are more conducive
to the punishment of those difficult to penalize, such as corporations. 44
However, opponents propose that the use of alternatives exemplifies
judicial leniency towards those who should receive their just desserts. 45
This leniency, they fear, could lead to abuse of alternatives resulting in
the release of violent criminals, further jeopardizing the public. 46 Oppo-"
nents are afraid that with the surge of alternative sentencing will come
the demise of a necessary prison system.47 Warning that there will
always be the need to lock away some of the more dangerous offenders,
opponents feel this trend could eliminate prison even as an "alternative."
also becoming commonplace. In addition, different forms of shock probation have appeared
in sentencing orders. The utilization of anti-drug and anti-alcohol programs, along with an
agreement to submit to periodic urinalysis or blood tests, has allowed many addicts to avoid
jail stays. Halfway houses and work release plans have also prospered. Furthermore,
requirements that the offender obey the law, submit to searches, get an education, and/or
hold a full-time job in order to support his family are used frequently. See COHEN & GoBERT,
supra note 10, at 218-343. Judges will often combine these alternatives to tailor the
sentence more closely to the needs of the criminal and the community. To assist the defense
attorney and ultimately the judge in arriving at a well-tailored alternative sentence, many
organizations, most notably the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, have
arisen and provide "client specific plans" for requesting defendants. Indeed, the respon-
sibility for the success of alternative sentences lies not only with the judges but also with
counsel, probation departments, prison staff, and police. See Middleton, Sentencing: The
Alternatives, 6 NAT'L L.J. 1 (Apr. 23, 1984); Ranii, Helping Attorneys Empty the Jails, 4 NAT'L
L.J. 1 (Nov. 23, 1981); Sweeney, A Sentencing Alternative Without Bars, 93 L.A. DAILY J. 21
(Oct. 16, 1980).
"' See English, 'Escaping' from Jail Alternatives to Incarceration, 194 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Nov.
13, 1985).
42 Id.
43 id.
44 See Merritt, Community Restitution-An Alternative Disposition for Corporate Of-
fenders, 20 CriaM. L. BULL. 355 (July-Aug. 1984); Note, Charitable Contributions as a
Condition of Probation For Convicted Corporations: Using Philanthropy to Combat Corpo-
rate Crime, 37 CASE W. RES. 569 (1986-87); Note, Charitable Contributions as a Condition of
Federal Probation for Corporate Defendants: A Controversial Sanction Under New Law, 60
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 530 (1985); Note, Corporate Probation Conditions: Judicial Creativity or
Abuse of Discretion?, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 637 (1984); Note, Punishing the Corporation:
Charitable Contributions as a Condition of Probation, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 1069 (1984). But see
Kahn, Charitable Contributions as Conditions of Probation, 48 FED. PRORATION 80 (Dec. 1984).
" See, e.g., COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 5.
46 Id.
4' See 4 NAT'L L.J. 47 (Apr. 26, 1982).
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As a result, many suggest defraying the costs of imprisonment by
requiring the convict to partially pay for his incarceration. 4s Neverthe-
less, with the realization that the alternative trend is a path well laid,
opponents caution that the alternatives should at least be structured as
scientifically as possible, avoiding orders for menial or demeaning
tasks.49
Recent press has brought to light a host of probationary conditions
which, although creative, seem to get exceedingly close to abuse of
discretion. It is often difficult to distinguish those sentences which are
merely unique with legitimate objectives from those which are abusive
and have few redeeming qualities. To make a distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate probation conditions requires a complete
review of the law of probation, with a necessary emphasis upon the
possible constitutional and criminal law issues. Of particular interest is
the propriety of scarlet letter conditions.
C. Probation
The meaning of the term probation is difficult to define due to its
constantly changing usage. 50 One way to create consistency in the
definition of probation is to define it by its elements. There are three
7 " See generally id.
49 The task should be "a needed service, rather than something invented merely for the
sake of punishing the offenders." 6 NAT'L L.J. 12 (Apr. 23, 1984).
50 Probation has been defined as "a sanction imposed by a court as punishment for a
criminal offense." COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 4. Additionally, the word has been used
"interchangeably to mean a legal disposition, a measure of leniency, a punitive measure, an
administrative process, and a treatment method . . . not to mention a sub-system of
corrections." Gray, Probation: An Exploration in Meaning, 50 FED. PROBATION 26 (Dec. 1986).
Modern day probation has its roots in the 18th and 19th centuries. The 18th century's
harsh hand toward punishment due to prevailing religious and ethical beliefs softened by
the middle of the century with the beginnings of social science and the rejection of certain
aspects of religious dogma. This reformation continued through the 19th century with its
serious criticism of criminal punishment and its retributive focus from a humanitarian and
utilitarian perspective. Significant efforts were made to attract attention to the cruelty of
corporal punishment, focusing mainly upon rehabilitative possibilities.
State adoption of probation began in 1841 with a Massachusetts shoemaker, John
Augustus, who regularly volunteered to assist in the rehabilitation of drunkards. This
informal practice led to his involvement in more structured programs of several thousand
adult and juvenile offenders. As a result of the efforts of Augustus and others who joined
him, the Massachusetts legislature established positions for full-time, salaried probation
officers. By 1867, probation was authorized in all states.
The practice of probation was mimicked by the federal courts although they were much
slower in adopting legislation authorizing such sanctions. In 1916, the United States
Supreme Court in the case of Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916), recognized that
Congress could, if it so desired, enact a law authorizing probation. Nonetheless, it took nine
years for Congress to enact the first federal probation law. Finally, the year 1925 saw
legislation establishing a probation system similar to that in existence today. COHEN &
GOBERT, supra note 10, at 6-8.
[Vol. 36:613
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characteristic elements of probation: (1) release of the offender into the
community (2) with certain conditions imposed upon him (3) under the
supervision of the probation department. 51 Generally, it is given in lieu of
a prison sentence.5 2 In practice, the judge, in accordance with a federal or
state statute, can suspend the execution of a traditional prison sentence
as long as the probation conditions are fulfilled. Should the probationer
breach an imposed condition, he may be incarcerated following a judicial
revocation proceeding. 53
Basically, there are three types of probation statutes, each of which
gives the sentencing judge significant latitude in determining and
imposing conditions. The first group is the most liberal, authorizing the
court to impose appropriate probation or parole conditions without
suggesting any specific conditions. 54 The second category of probation
statutes is more specific, dictating a few mandatory conditions and
authorizing the decisionmaker to impose others as appropriate. 55 The
third and most popular type of statute lists many specific conditions a
court may impose if it so desires. Much discretion is afforded the
decisionmaker under this popular statute, enhanced frequently by a
catch-all phrase which authorizes the imposition of other reasonable
conditions. 56 With a specific list available to the judge, some degree of
uniformity can be ensured in the system while maintaining flexibility.
For the purpose of further analysis, it will be assumed that either the first
or the third category of statutes prevails since they most accurately
reflect the majority of both state and federal laws today.
D. Probation Conditions
The awarding of probation is not a right but an allowance of grace, 57
and the sentencing judge is afforded the widest latitude in the imposition
5' Gray, Probation: An Exploration in Meaning, 50 FED. PROBATION 26 (Dec. 1986).
5 COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 4.
5 Id. at 13.
4 Id. at 189. For instance, one statute provides that "the conditions of probation shall
be such as the court in its discretion deems reasonably necessary to insure that the
defendant will not again violate the law." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.021 (Vernon 1979).
" To illustrate, a statute may require that each probationer be ordered to violate no
state or local criminal laws, to remain within the state unless given the court's consent to
leave, and to report regularly to the probation counselor; other conditions may be imposed.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 771.3 (West 1982). In practice, this statute's terms rarely differ from
the two other categories since mandatory conditions are routinely imposed anyway. COHEN
& GOBERT, supra note 10, at 189.
" Id. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 5-4-303 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-30 (West 1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 1985); HAw. REV. STAT. § 706-624 (1985);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 533.030 (Baldwin 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1343 (1987); Thx. Cram.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 6 (Vernon 1974).
57 State v. Smith, 112 Ariz. 416, 419, 542 P.2d 1115, 1118 (1975).
1988]
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of conditions.58 However, "[a]s wide as a court's discretion is ... it must
never be forgotten that it is a sound discretion that must be exercised. A
court must not make a decision 'characterized by capriciousness or
arbitrariness or by a failure to conduct an adequate investigation into the
facts."' 59 Thus, the well settled rule is that probation conditions must
have a reasonable relationship to both the rehabilitative treatment of the
accused and the protection of the public.60
According to the leading federal case of United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez,61 to determine whether a reasonable relationship exists con-
sideration must be given to the purposes sought to be served by probation,
the extent to which full constitutional guarantees available to those not
under probation should be accorded probationers, and the legitimate
needs of law enforcement. Using the same factors, the later federal case
of Higdon v. United States6 2 modified the Consuelo-Gonzalez test by
applying it in a two step process. First, an examination is made of the
purposes for which the judge imposed the conditions. If those purposes are
permissible, the second step is to determine if a reasonable relationship
exists between the conditions and the purposes. At this point, a review is
made of the conditions' impact on the probationer's rights and the extent
to which the conditions serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement.
Worded slightly differently, a state court in People v. Dominguez3
articulated its version of the test as:
A condition of probation which (1) has no relation to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is
not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is
not reasonably related to future criminality does not serve the
statutory ends of probation and is invalid.64
Furthermore, the reasonableness limitation encompasses the concept
that conditions must be such that the probationer is able to comply with
them.65 Of course, if the conditions are successful under the test, yet the
defendant considers them more harsh than the traditional sentence the
58 United States v. Chapel, 428 F.2d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1970).
5 State v. Douglas, 87 Ariz. 182, 187, 349 P.2d 622, 625, cert. denied, 363 U.S. 815
(1960).
60 As such, probation conditions can be divided into two groups: those aimed at reform
and those aimed at control. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 186.
61 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975).
62 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980).
6 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
64 Id. at 627, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
65 Based on this rationale, a requirement that an alcoholic refrain from drinking was
invalidated. Sweeney v. United States, 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965).
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court could otherwise impose, he has the right to refuse probation and
undergo the sentence. 66
To begin, the primary purpose of probation under both state and federal
law is to rehabilitate the offender. 67 According to the Higdon court, "the
only factors which the trial judge should consider when deciding whether
to grant probation are the appropriateness and attainability of rehabili-
tation and the need to protect the public by imposing conditions which
control the probationer's activities."68 Neither punishment nor the use of
probation to circumvent statutory sentencing limits may be primary
purposes.69 Although a seemingly restrictive rule, uncertainty as to how
rehabilitation is accomplished necessarily renders it quite flexible.
Secondly, it is recognized that even though probationers are subject to
constitutional limitations from which ordinary persons are free, these
limitations should be narrowly drawn to achieve a permissible objective
without unnecessarily restricting the probationer's otherwise lawful
activities. 70 It is impermissible for the impact of the condition to be
needlessly harsh.7 1 The court in Consuelo-Gonzalez found that with
respect to a case brought under the Federal Probation Act:
Conditions that unquestionably restrict otherwise inviolable con-
stitutional rights may properly be subject to special scrutiny to
determine whether the limitation does in fact serve the dual
objectives of rehabilitation and public safety. But this is not to
say that there is any presumption, however weak, that such
limitations are impermissible. Rather, it is necessary to recognize
that when fundamental rights are curbed it must be done
sensitively and with a keen appreciation that the infringement
must serve the broad purposes of the Probation Act. 72
66 See, e.g., State v. Davis, 119 Ariz. 140, 579 P.2d 1110 (1978).
7 The theme that rehabilitation underlies probation is mirrored not only in the
probation systems established under state law, but also in the Model Penal Code
which expressly recognizes rehabilitation by authorizing the imposition of any
conditions of probation reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the defendant
and not unduly restrictive of his liberty or incompatible with his freedom of
conscience.
United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 (9th Cir. 1975).
68 627 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1980).
69 Id. at 898.
70 id.
71 Id.
72 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
added). The court cautioned that it expressed no opinion regarding the extent to which
states may infringe upon a probationer's constitutional rights but given the great similarity
between federal and state statutes in this area and the reliance by state courts upon this
case, the view here may be considered universal. Id. at 266.
1988]
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Of final interest to the reviewing court is the manner in which the
condition enhances law enforcement73 Conditions which serve to protect
the public from recidivism by the probationer or to deter others through
example are not considered contrary to the statute as long as they
substantially serve the purpose of rehabilitation.7 4
E. The Scarlet Letter Condition
A scarlet letter condition of probation is one in which the probationer
is required to attach a warning upon his or another's property which
sends a message to the public that he has been convicted of a crime. 75 For
instance, on May 20, 1987, Richard J. Bateman, a twice-convicted child
molester, was required as a condition of a five year probation, again for
child molestation, to place upon the door of his residence and on both
doors of any vehicle he may operate, in three inch letters, "DANGEROUS
SEX OFFENDER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED."76 To determine the
propriety of this special probation condition under the Consuelo-Gonzalez
test, it will be necessary to examine thoroughly both its constitutional
and criminal law ramifications.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Significantly, there have been few constitutional challenges to proba-
tion conditions. As a consequence, the law in this area is sparse. The
scarcity of challenges is due mainly to the fact that most offenders are
delighted merely at the thought of not having to go to prison. The
challenges are few particularly in the area of scarlet letter conditions due
to the rarity of their imposition. Nevertheless, with the current state of
73 Id. at 266-67.
74 Id. at 267.
7' The phrase 'scarlet letter' is derived from Nathaniel Hawthorne's classic of American
literature, THE SCARLET LETTER (1850).
" Richard Bateman pled no contest on November 22, 1985, to one count of sexual abuse
in the first degree. A second count of sexual abuse was dismissed. On May 20, 1987, the trial
court suspended imposition of the sentence and placed Bateman on probation for a period of
five years. In addition to the scarlet letter condition, the other conditions of his probation
were (1) that he be incarcerated in the Multnomah County Jail for a period of one year and
participate in and successfully complete a 30-day residential alcohol treatment program; (2)
that he maintain full-time employment; (3) that he abstain from the use of any alcoholic
beverages and prescription drugs/narcotics without notification from his doctor to defen-
dant's probation officer; (4) that he participate in any sexual offender treatment program as
directed by his probation officer; (5) that he submit to polygraph examination at his
expense; (6) that he submit to random breath testing and/or urinalysis testing; (7) that he
not return within ten blocks of his address; (8) that he have no contact with minors; and (10)
that he be banned from parks, playgrounds, the zoo, school grounds or any place where
children normally congregate. Judgment and Probation Order at 1-2, Oregon v. Bateman,
No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. June 15, 1987).
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prisons and the attitudes of both the public and those within the criminal
justice system, this type of restriction has the potential to be imposed
with greater frequency.
Due possibly to the weakness of state constitutions, a preference for a
federal forum, or tactical considerations, most challenges to probation
conditions have been grounded in the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution, depending upon whether there has been
federal or state action. 77 As such, the focus of this analysis will be upon
those amendments which may reach and somehow affect the propriety of
a scarlet letter condition.
Initially, it is necessary to explore the status of a probationer's
constitutional rights. As referred to earlier, the rights of probationers are
limited by conditions of probation which are desirable for purposes of
rehabilitation. 78 If probation conditions diminish constitutionally pro-
tected rights, they are tested by their necessity for making probation
effective. 79 Accordingly, it is recognized that "a probationer retains all
civil liberties except those which are taken away as conditions of
probation."80 Under this lenient standard, unless the terms of probation
needlessly or viciously violate a constitutional right, they will most likely
be upheld. Still, an unquestionable restriction upon an otherwise invio-
lable constitutional right will be subject to special scrutiny and require
an explanation of why a lesser invasion was inappropriate.8 ' Thus, even
if an abridgement is found, the analysis continues as to whether the
condition fulfills the Consuelo-Gonzalez and Dominguez tests.8 2 The
immediate discussion is limited to the constitutional aspect of the tests
and the effect of scarlet letter punishment. The next section will examine
the criminal law justifications for such a sanction.
A. Freedom of Speech
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom of speech.8 3 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly
found that the right of freedom of thought protected by the first amend-
w See COHEN & GOaERT, supra note 10, at 212-17.
7 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
71 State v. Sprague, 52 Or. App. 1063, 1065, 629 P.2d 1326, 1328 (1981).
'" State v. Culbertson, 29 Or. App. 363, 369, 563 P.2d 1224, 1229 (1977). See also Coffin
v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945) (a
probationer "retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by
necessary implication, taken from him by law.").
s' United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975).
82 See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
" U.S. CONST. amend. I provides that: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
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ment includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all. 84 Early decisions, however, showed little inclination to
extend this protection to probationers.85 By contrast, recent decisions
have been much more sympathetic.8 6
It may be argued that by requiring a probationer to place signs on the
doors of his home and vehicle, he is compelled on a daily basis to
announce to the rest of the world that he is a dangerous sex offender. It
is as if he is required twenty-four hours a day to stand at an open air
podium and declare to the public that he is a sexual deviant-a catharsis
which may have little cleansing effect. As a result of this requirement,
his right to freedom of speech, or in this case the right to refrain from
speaking, is surely abridged.
Nonetheless, the only court considering this specific argument has
found it untenable. In Goldschmitt v. Florida,8 7 the appellant argued that
the trial court had infringed upon his first amendment rights by forcing
him to broadcast an ideological message via a bumper sticker reading
"CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE."8 The court rejected
this contention, finding that the message was far from ideological, that it
was legitimate as a form of penance and a warning to other potential
wrongdoers.8 9 Clearly, to be successful, the appellant has the onerous
burden of proving that the condition is so unnecessarily restrictive that
he is deprived completely of his right of expression, or, as in the Bateman
case, his right not to express.
Although this may be true, an argument can be made that these house
and car signs are much more burdensome on the offender than a bumper
sticker. First, they are exceedingly larger and more visible to the public.
Second, they are attached to more than a mere car bumper. Third, they
contain an extremely inflammatory and stigmatizing message. These
distinctions illuminate the undue harshness of the condition.
B. Freedom of Association
The first amendment does not explicitly mention freedom of associa-
tion; however, the United States Supreme Court has recognized this
freedom derived by implication from the explicitly stated rights of speech,
press, assembly, and petition. 90 The freedom of association is limited in
scope and covers only the "right to join with others to pursue goals
s See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
85 See Morris v. State, 44 Ga. App. 765, 162 S.E. 879 (1932).
8 See Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971); In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d
953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
87 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
s Id.
89 Id. at 125.
90 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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independently protected by the first amendment" such as political advo-
cacy, literary expression, and religious worship.91 Furthermore, as noted
earlier, the standard of review is not as rigid for a probationer whose
constitutional expectations are lowered.92 It seems, as with freedom of
speech, that the associational rights of a probationer are abridged only by
severe and unnecessary infringements. 93 However, a trend of success is
developing for many probationers challenging such conditions on this
ground9 4
Even with this lowered expectation, a scarlet letter punishment can
still be said to infringe upon the freedom of association to such an extent
as to completely eradicate any residual fragments which remain of this
right. Requiring signs on the probationer's front door and car doors
seriously limits any possible associations he may desire. For instance, the
probationer may want to join a religious group in order to improve his
ethical and moral standards; yet, it is difficult, if not impossible, to do so
if he has to drive to a place of worship with sex offender warnings on his
car. Furthermore, he cannot possibly invite religious members to his
home because of the sign on his front door. This problem has ramifica-
tions which reach not only his religious affiliations but also into all other
potential relationships having constitutional protection. It may be ar-
gued that the probationer need not drive, but can alternatively walk, ride
in another's vehicle, or take public transportation in order to facilitate his
freedom of association. However, it is obvious that this solution is weak
since there will be situations in which none of these three alternatives is
available. Hence, a substantial interference with this constitutional right
is apparent, deserving of strong scrutiny from the reviewing court.95
9' L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 702 (1978).
92 Strict scrutiny is the standard usually applied when government interference with
freedom of association is apparent. The test involves an examination of whether the
governmental interest is compelling and cannot be achieved through means less restrictive.
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
" See In re Mannino, 14 Cal. App. 3d 953, 92 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1971).
94 Id.
9' Yet, above this enthusiasm it should be remembered that courts will reach to find the
intrusion insubstantial, halting the analysis early on. See, e.g., United States v. Albanese,
554 F.2d 543, 545-47 (2d Cir. 1977) (condition that probationer associate only with
law-abiding citizens upheld); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975) (probation including prohibition from participating in the
American Irish Republican movement upheld); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 334 (10th
Cir. 1971) (condition prohibiting probationer from activity urging violation of tax laws
would be valid). If the intrusion is found excessively harsh, further analysis is necessary to
determine if it can be justified under reasonable relationship considerations. For example,
in Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), a requirement that a convicted
child abuser not associate with children was upheld; however, a further restriction
prohibiting marriage and pregnancy to avoid any possible future child contact was struck
down. Clearly, the means do not always justify the ends.
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C. Right to Privacy
Hinged upon the Constitution's fifth96 and fourteenth97 amendments'
due process clauses is protection of the right to privacy. 98 Since the
Supreme Court is reluctant to find new fundamental rights and since
there is no known fundamental right for a probationer not to be required
to display his record,99 the restriction need only be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental end.10 0 The possibility of striking down the
condition is slim since the right of privacy has been extended only to
limited types of conditions. 10 In combination, this makes for little
privacy protection. Moreover, the argument is not strengthened by the
fact that a probationer's record is already public information.
Yet, however minimal the privacy right may be, it can be argued that
the scarlet letter probation condition is not drawn sufficiently narrow,
affecting more of Bateman's life and privacy interests than necessary. If
it can be proven that the condition substantially infringes upon family
life and personal relations, the reviewing court may apply strict scrutiny,
requiring the government to show that its means are necessary and that
it has a compelling interest. By requiring signs prohibiting children, the
court has, in effect, barred this probationer for the next five years from
getting married 10 2 and having children or from having young relatives
visit his home. As such, the condition may be said to unnecessarily
infringe upon an area protected by the right to privacy. 10
96 U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any person ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[N]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... "
98 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99 Cf Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (plaintiff's interest in reputation, by itself, was
not a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest).
1o See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
'01 See, e.g., COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 254-55 (right of privacy extended to
nonassociation conditions).
102 Cf Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (the right to marry is viewed by the
Supreme Court as fundamental; substantial interferences with that right will, therefore,
not be sustained merely because they are rational).
103 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (prohibition of
marriage and pregnancy invalid); State v. Livingston, 53 Ohio App. 2d 195, 372 N.E.2d
1335 (1976) (condition of having no children while on probation invalid).
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D. Right to Work
Both under the federal and state Constitution's due process clauses, a
person has a right to work in his chosen field of occupation. 10 4 This right
is not absolute and, once again, a probationer has a lowered expectancy
of it. With a scarlet letter probation condition requiring such inflamma-
tory warning signs on the probationer's car doors, a convict will have a
difficult, if not impossible, task in finding or retaining employment. Few
employers are willing to hire convicts due to their fear of the convict
himself and the possible loss of business. Furthermore, the probationer
may be in a specialized field of work which requires him to report to
different locations and transport many tools with him, thus, a vehicle is
imperative to his work. As a result, this interference with his right to
work may be substantial enough to warrant invalidating the car signs.
E. The Taking Clause
Governments, both state and federal, have the right to take private
property for public use provided that just compensation is paid. 10 5 Two
issues are important to the taking analysis: (1) whether there is a public
use and (2) whether there is a taking or merely a regulation.
By placing a warning sign on the front door of a private residence and
both doors of a car, it may be argued that the government has taken this
property for public use. The Supreme Court has construed the require-
ment of public use quite broadly. In a recent case, it stated that "[t]he
'public' use requirement is... coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's
police powers. ' ' 1°6 So long as the government's use of its eminent domain
power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the public use
requirement is satisfied.10 7 The governmental action need only further
the community's general welfare.10 8 The signs are posted to warn the
community; in other words, for their protection. Parents are supposed to
caution their children to stay away in order to avoid further child
molestation. Therefore, the signs embody a legitimate public purpose.
104 Reference to the right to work in this section is separate and apart from state and
federal legislation regarding the right to work involving union coercion. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.
§ 164(b) (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 34-6-6 (1982). Interference with the right to work under the
fourteenth amendment is subject to minimal scrutiny by the court. See supra note 97; see
also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). If the probation order demands full-time
employment, it cannot rationally require scarlet letter signs. The two requirements are
incompatible and, thus, irrational.
10' The fifth and fourteenth amendments limit the federal and state governments' power
of eminent domain. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
'or Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
107 Id.
"' See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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Assuming that there is a public purpose, the next issue to be considered
is whether the signs are merely regulatory, requiring no compensation or
a taking requiring compensation. Since the warnings are posted for only
five years, there is no permanent physical occupation and, hence, no per
se taking.10 9 However, there may be such a drastic reduction in the value
of the owner's property that a taking can still be found.110 By requiring a
lessee-probationer to post the signs on his residence, the court may be
causing a significant diminution in the value of the landlord's property.
Furthermore, neighboring properties will decrease in value, especially if
the probationer desires to live in a family-oriented area. Thus, the
government may be subject to lawsuits and required to pay for the public
use of property because of this scarlet letter probation condition.
F. Vagueness
Where the conditions of probation are not clearly specified, the proba-
tioner may encounter difficulty in obeying them despite a good faith
desire to do so."'I Since virtually no statute provides for a standard to be
used in construing probation conditions, courts have taken a somewhat
informal approach, "asking only whether common English usage would
include the questionable conduct within the category of acts proscribed by
the vague condition."" 2
The ramifications of a vague condition are not only of statutory, but
also of constitutional proportions. Analogizing to statutes defining
crimes, probationers have argued that the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments require that a condition of probation be stated with sufficient
clarity to inform a person of ordinary intelligence of the conduct which is
prohibited. 113 Courts have declared that these amendments govern the
required clarity but they do not agree upon the appropriate test to
determine failure of the imposed condition due to vagueness. 14
109 See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
110 See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("While property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
"' "Indeed, some conditons are intentionally left vague to give probation authorities
greater flexibility." COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 196.
112 Id.; see State v. Boggs, 16 N.C. App. 403, 192 S.E.2d 29 (1972). Another view is that
since a probation "order involves the administration of criminal justice, the rule requiring
penal statutes to be strictly construed is applicable." COHEN & GoBERT, supra note 10, at 196;
see, e.g., Gaddis v. United States, 280 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1960); In re Osslo, 51 Cal. 2d 371,
334 P.2d 1 (1958); People v. Sutton, 322 Mich. 104, 33 N.W.2d 681 (1948).
113 See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926).
114 See Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974). Frequently, the courts will
require that the condition be comprehensible to the offender, irrespective of whether it
would be understood by a reasonably intelligent person. See, e.g., Rich v. State, 640 P.2d 159
(Alaska Ct. App. 1982); People v. Reinertson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 320, 223 Cal. Rptr. 670
(1986); Norris v. State, 383 So. 2d 691 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Almond v. State, 350 So.
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A scarlet letter condition requiring that the offender "place upon his
door of residence, in three-inch lettering, DANGEROUS SEX OFFEND-
ER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED" 115 and "on any vehicle he may operate
he place signs on both doors that read DANGEROUS SEX OFFEND-
ER-NO CHILDREN ALLOWED"116 may be challenged as unconstitu-
tionally vague. First, the probationer may have more than one residence.
If this is the case, must he place signs upon all of his front doors? Second,
what size lettering is needed for the signs on the vehicle doors and on how
many doors must he post it if the car is a four-door? Third, what does "any
vehicle he may operate" include? If he is required on the job to use a
forklift, is this a vehicle within the meaning of the condition? These
questions are not really trivial when one considers their ramifications on
the probationer's life. For instance, an employer who gives him a job on
a construction site will not be pleased when he places sex offender signs
on the doors of his machinery.
G. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The eighth amendment to the United States Constitution contains a
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.11 7 Derived from the
English Bill of Rights, the American drafters who adopted the phrase
were primarily concerned with banning torture and barbarous methods
of punishment.11s Since its adoption, the prohibition has been liberalized
and broadened.11 9 Given its expansion, a convincing argument may be
2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 301 A.2d 26 (1973).
Some courts require, additionally, that probation officials clearly understand the condition's
meaning. See, e.g., Watson v. State, 17 Md. App. 263, 301 A.2d 26 (1973); Glenn v. State, 168
Tex. Crim. 312, 327 S.W.2d 763 (1959).
Whether the condition will be found unconstitutionally vague depends not only upon the
test used, but also upon the light in which it is being viewed. Since the question of clarity
does not usually arise until after the condition has been violated, courts tend to deal with
whether the alleged violation falls within the condition rather than whether the condition
is unconstitutionally vague in the abstract. Although courts are becoming more receptive to
vagueness challenges, they are still reluctant to invalidate the vague condition, especially
those challenged as abstractly vague. The reluctance in this area may reflect a general
judicial disinclination to adjudicate issues when a case or controversy has not yet arisen. On
the other hand, courts often frown upon probationers who fail to obtain a judicial
interpretation of a vague condition. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 198-99.
1 " Judgment and Probation Order at 2, Oregon v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App.
June 15, 1987).
116 Id.
117 U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII provides that: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
118 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). See also Granucci, "Nor Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839,852-53 (1969).
'1 In 1910, the Supreme Court, in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,367 (1910), held
that punishment for a crime should be proportional to the offense. Fifty years later, the
interpretation of the eighth amendment was further broadened by the holding of Trop v.
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made that requiring the posting of signs constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.
The first hurdle to overcome in order to successfully challenge the
scarlet letter condition is the argument that probation is not in fact
punishment within the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause.' 20 It may be argued that probation has historically been consid-
ered an act of grace whereby the convict is allowed to avoid punishment
as long as he adheres to its conditions.121 If he finds these conditions too
harsh, he may either elect to take the traditional sentence or disobey the
conditions causing imposition of the sentence. 122 Thus, the most severe
punishment facing a defaulting probationer is the revocation of probation
and the imposition of the original sentence. Since the convict in this
sexual abuse case faced five years prison and a $100,000 fine, which
would certainly pass constitutional muster, it can be argued that the
voluntary probation term is substantially less severe and, therefore, also
constitutional. 12
3
However, if probation is not punishment, what is it? It is undeniably a
reaction by the criminal justice system to a breach of the law which
contains all or some of the elements of punishment. Also, as explained
earlier, it is considered an alternative sentence. Although technically
voluntary, for many convicts there is little choice but to take the
probation and its conditions given the state of prisons and the attendant
risks, especially when a child molester is incarcerated. In effect, prison
means harassment, possible infliction of physical and mental pain and
disease, or even death. 24 As such, it may be erroneous and unfair to
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958), that punishment should fall within the limits of civilized
standards. The expansion continued in 1962 in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962), when the Court decided to apply the eighth amendment to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. In this case, the Court held that a state statute authorizing
imprisonment of drug addicts was unconstitutional. It recognized that the eighth amend-
ment could preclude punishment if the behavior in question was not punishable; in other
words, due to a disease which was beyond the control of the victim. Id. Finding that the
amendment proscribes only those punishments which involve the "unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain," the Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), rejected
the proposition that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
120 As the court in United States v. Springer, 148 F.2d 411, 415 (9th Cir. 1945),
recognized in dictum:
The conditions of probation are not punitive in character and the question of
whether or not the terms are cruel and unusual and thus violative of the
Constitution of the United States does not arise for reason that the Constitution
applies only to punishment. These conditions of probation are intended to be an
amelioration of the punishment prescribed by law for the given offense.
121 Brief for Appellee at 24-29, Oregon v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. Nov. 1987).
12 See COHEN & GOBsEr, supra note 10, at 161-78.
2' Brief for Appellee, supra note 121.
124 See Poppens, Marion Aftermath: Amnesty International releases its report, and
responses come from Washington--and from inside the prison itself, 16 STUDENT LAW. 6 (Sept.
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characterize the choice of a convict as voluntary and, therefore, not
punishment. In support, there are many recent cases which consider
conditions of probation under contentions that they are unnecessarily
harsh or cruel and unusual punishment. 125
Although recognizing that probationers are entitled to some protection
from cruel and unusual punishment, court decisions are extremely
inconsistent in their application of this prohibition, upholding seemingly
extreme conditions and striking down somewhat less intrusive ones. 126
Unfortunately, the rare time an appellate court has examined a scarlet
letter punishment for an eighth amendment violation, it upheld the trial
court's decision imposing a bumper sticker warning on a drunk driving
offender's car as a condition of probation. The court in the recent case of
Goldschmitt v. Florida127 held that "the differences between the degrad-
1987); Rowe, Death Row: AIDS is turning a prison term into a potential death sentence, 7
CAL. LAW. 49 (Sept. 1987).
12' As the Supreme Court of New Jersey has recognized: "Probation assumes the offender
can be rehabilitated without serving the suspended jail sentence. But this is not to say that
probation is meant to be painless. Probation has an inherent sting, and restrictions placed
upon the freedom of the probationer are realistically punitive in quality." In re Buehrer, 50
N.J. 501, 509,236 A.2d 592, 596 (1967). See also Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d
73 (9th Cir. 1963); State v. Fuentes, 26 Ariz. App. 444, 549 P.2d 224 (1976); Bienz v. State,
343 So. 2d 913 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Labure, 427 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983).
"' Based upon the proposition that a condition so harsh that the probationer is destined
for failure serves no purpose, many state courts have struck down harsh curfew conditions.
State v. Carey, 392 So. 2d 443, 444 (La. 1981). See also Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); State v. Labure, 427 So. 2d 855 (La. 1983); People v. Peterson, 62
Mich. App. 258, 233 N.W.2d 250 (1975). But cf. People v. Reinertson, 178 Cal. App. 3d 320,
223 Cal. Rptr. 670 (1986) (upholding probation condition requiring offender to be at home
at all times unless traveling to or from work); Johnson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 226, 291
S.E.2d 94 (1982) (10 p.m. to 6 a.m. curfew upheld without discussion). Furthermore, a
condition requiring the offender, a noncitizen, to depart from the United States was rejected
as either cruel and unusual punishment amounting to banishment by a federal court or a
denial of due process of law. Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73, 76 (9th Cir.
1963). In addition, a Florida court struck down a requirement that a probationer, accused
of acting like a baby, wear diapers while in his halfway house finding it to be "demeaning
in the minds of so-called reasonable men.... Bienz v. State, 343 So. 2d 913,914 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977). Thus, the eighth amendment prohibition has a wide spectrum of coverage
over many degrees of severity. However, this observation must be contrasted with other
courts' refusals to reject seemingly equal, if not more severe, sanctions upon probationers.
A convicted thief, for instance, was compelled as a term of his probation to wear taps on his
shoes whenever he left his residence. The court found an eighth amendment challenge to
this condition without merit explaining that "merely because a condition is out of the
ordinary does not make it constitutionally unreasonable." People v. McDowell, 59 Cal. App.
3d 807, 812, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 843 (1976).
127 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Approving of this type of punishment, the
court in United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982), found it
to be quite effective by "inflict[ing] disgrace and contumely in a dramatic and spectacular
manner." The court's view was that: "Measures are effective which have the impact of the
'scarlet letter' described by Nathaniel Hawthorne, or the English equivalent of 'wearing
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ing physical rigors of the pillory and a small strip of colorful adhesive far
outweigh the similarities. The mere requirement that a defendant
display a 'scarlet letter' as part of his punishment is not necessarily
offensive to the Constitution."128 It was just a reminder that the offend-
er's conduct was legally and socially wrong. 129 In the final analysis, the
court found itself unable to hold the bumper sticker sufficiently humili-
ating to trigger constitutional objections. 130 However, it did recognize
that "such innovative dispositions can be carried to extremes which
might offend constitutional standards."'13 1
With this caveat, there remains an argument that warning signs of a
dangerous sex offender are cruel and unusual punishment because of
their extremely humiliating impact. Not only must the sign be large
enough to accommodate three-inch letters, but it also contains a strong
message and must be posted on a residence and a car. Any sense of
dignity the probationer may retain is completely erased. According to
Justice Brennan, "even the vilest criminal remains a human being
possessed of common human dignity."'1 32 Thus, many Supreme Court
cases recognize that a punishment which is so harsh as to be morally
unacceptable to reasonable men' 33 and severely degrade human
dignity 134 is prohibited by the eighth amendment. This proscription
includes both mental and physical pain.135
III. CRIMINAL LAW ISSUES
According to the Consuelo-Gonzalez test, the assessment of a probation
condition does not cease after a discovery of a constitutional
infringement. 13 6 Further analysis of its criminal law justifications is
necessary. In order to fully understand these issues, it is important to
begin this discussion by examining who is receiving probation and what
criteria are used to best make the determination.137 A review of scientific
studies on probation success, especially with sex offenders, is critical to
this discussion. Nevertheless, the heart of the analysis is an evaluation of
papers' in the vicinity of Westminster Hall like a sandwich-man's sign describing the
culprit's transgressions." Id. However, this case was overruled by United States v. Missouri
Valley Constr. Co., 741 F.2d 1542 (8th Cir. 1984).
128 Id. at 125.
129 Id. at 126.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972).
133 Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
'3 Furman, 408 U.S. at 270-71.
See Trop v. Dulies, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
131 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
137 See infra notes 139-75 and accompanying text.
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the justifications for the use of a scarlet letter probation condition.13S As
discussed earlier, a probation condition must fulfill some key objectives to
be valid. Thus, an indepth analysis is required of whether a scarlet letter
condition can accomplish such goals as rehabilitation and protection of
the public.
A. Eligibility
Since probation is statutory, the legislature will often restrict the class
of defendants who are eligible. The factors most frequently taken into
account are the nature of the offense committed, the manner in which the
offense was committed, the nature of the offender, or the nature of the
victim. 139 However, some statutes do not specify any limitation on
eligibility, leaving the matter to the judge's discretion.140 Of course, there
are constitutional and statutory limitations upon this discretion, but
"[b]y making probation a possible sentence, the legislature has directed
courts to consider probation as a possible sanction." 41
In choosing the alternative, the courts under most statutes tend to
apply a factor approach which examines a host of variables. Since these
variables are numerous, only those relating more closely to the situation
at hand will be considered. Given that rehabilitation is a primary goal of
probation,1 42 the most crucial element to be weighed is the defendant's
attitude towards the crime and rehabilitation. 14 3 This can be at least
131 See infra notes 176-93 and accompanying text.
139 COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 35-64. Statutes taking into account the nature of the
offense restrict probation based upon either the possible penalty or the particular crime.
Exemplifying laws considering the manner of the crime are those which mandate a sentence
when a handgun is used or when serious injury has resulted. With regard to the
characteristics of the offender, statutes often specify eligibility in terms of whether the
defendant has a prior conviction, a previous probation term, or certain personal character-
istics. Lastly, the legislature may have taken into consideration the vulnerability of the
victim based upon mental or physical incapacities due to age or retardation. Id.
140 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.090 (1987); Amz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-901 (1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-53-04 (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8 (1956); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 205
(1986).
141 COHEN & GoBERT, supra note 10, at 41. As a result, "[a] court's failure to do so may be
reviewed as an abuse of discretion and reversible error", especially since defendants have a
"right to have the court consider all available alternatives." Id. United States v. Hayward,
471 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1972); Sanchez v. State, 592 P.2d 1130 (Wyo. 1979). Furthermore,
some authorities mandate that the judge choose the least restrictive alternative available
to him under the statute. COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 43. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST., Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures
§ 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968); NAT'L ADVIS. COMMISSION ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS,
Corrections, Standard 5.2 (1973); MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS ACT § 3-102(3) (1979);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
142 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez; 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
143 See, e.g., People v. Fowler, 109 Cal. App. 3d 557, 167 Cal. Rptr. 235 (1980); State v.
Trog, 323 N.W.2d 28 (Minn. 1982); Ball v. State, 604 S.W.2d 65 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1979). See
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partially determined through his ability to feel remorse, to admit
responsibility, or to be truthful.144 The defendant's dangerousness is also
a relevant factor. 145 Incarceration may be the only appropriate sanction
for those offenders who seriously threaten the public and are likely to
repeat the offense. However, many commentators have questioned the
court's ability to accurately predict future criminality. 146 This leads to
another important indicator, the defendant's prior criminal record. 147
Most theories of punishment weigh heavily the past criminal record when
determining if rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, or incapacitation
will be effectively accomplished through probation. Prior criminal acts
are considered reliable indicators of future behavior. 148
In most cases, the defendant's medical condition is not a factor taken
into account; however, a sex offender's medical condition and the assis-
tance he could receive on probation as opposed to jail should probably be
appraised by the sentencing court. 149 Judges often consider the defen-
dant's use of alcohol and its relation to the crime, but the effect of this
factor in sentencing hearings is not clear.'50 Some studies show a
significant correlation between a probationer's recidivism and chemical
abuse, while others find no such relationship.15 1 The need for deterrence
in the case of a sex offender is an especially pertinent consideration.
Naturally, the assumption is that he needs to be incarcerated. However,
some particularly well designed probation conditions may have a suffi-
ciently onerous effect on the probationer to be an effective deterrent.
Of course, the nature and seriousness of the offense are often reviewed
by the court.'6 2 Minor offenses tend to receive probation more frequently,
although there is an increasing percentage of felons being conditionally
released. 5 3 The legitimacy of using the seriousness of the crime has been
challenged by those who believe rehabilitation and recidivism are not
linked to this factor. 54 Yet, the factor's use may be justified by the other
objectives of punishment.
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(2)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)(using defendant's attitude
as a mitigating factor).
114 CoHN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 46-48.
145 Id. at 52.
146 Id. In fact, the MODEL SENTENCING & CORRECTONS ACT § 3-102(6) (1979) forbids the use of
predictions unless based upon prior criminal acts.
147 COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 53-54.
148 See R. HooD & R. SPARKS, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINOLOGY 180 (1970).
149 COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 55-58.
150 Id. at 58.
1" Id.; see NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENm. & CsnM. JUST., CRITICAL ISSUES IN ADULT PROBATON 37 (1979).
152 COHEN & GoszsT, supra note 10, at 61.
3 See infra note 158 and accompanying text.
154 R. HOOD & R. SPARKS, supra note 148, at 180-81.
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The need for public protection is often cited as justification for the
selection of incarceration over probation. 155 Although the public may be
safer while the offender is imprisoned, there are problems with using
incarceration in this way. First, it is difficult to predict who is actually
dangerous to society. 156 Second, with the overcrowded status of prisons
and lack of funds, the protection will be short-lived. The offender will
receive parole or release quickly and it is unlikely that he has been
provided with or has had the chance to profit from a rehabilitation
program. 157 Third, the public can be effectively protected by the many
conditions which may be placed on the probationer's action.
B. Felony Probation
Due to the fact that many states are operating under a liberal statute
devoid of guidance, offenders who would be considered ineligible under
other statutes are frequently receiving probation. These liberal statutes,
along with the overcrowded penal system and the disillusionment at the
supposed advantages of prison, have led to a huge increase in the use of
probation for felons.158 By contrast, probation was originally intended for
offenders who posed little threat to society and were believed to be
capable of rehabilitation. 15 9 This situation raises serious issues as to
whether the structure of the current probation system can accommodate
serious offenders given its original intent and supervisional set-up. Of
specific concern to this Note is whether it is sensible and appropriate to
put a child molester on probation.160
155 COHEN & GOBERT, supra note 10, at 62.
156 Id. See infra text accompanying notes 158-75. See also Forst, Selective Incapacitation:
An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 47 FED. PROBATION 19, 21 (Sept. 1983).
' Cf Heijder, Can We Cope With Alternatives?, 26 CRIME & DELINQ. 1 (Jan. 1980) (the
author suggests that one solution is to shorten all prison sentences considerably).
158 Today, over one-third of the nation's adult probation population consists of persons
convicted in superior courts of felonies. Petersilia, Probation and Felony Offenders, 51 FED.
PROBATION 56 (June 1987) (explaining the results of the Rand Corporation study).
159 Id.
16 Based on analysis of recidivism rates, the Rand Corporation study concluded that
"Iflelony probation presents a serious threat to public safety." Id. at 57. Only 35% of the
felony probationers in the study's sample managed to remain on the "straight and narrow."
Id. In other words, "65% ... were rearrested and 53% had official charges filed against
them." Id. Of these charges, 75% involved violent crimes. Id. Further, it took violent
offenders a median time of only eight months to re-offend. Id. at 58. Fortunately, a more
recent study done by Gennaro F. Vito, Ph.D. at the University of Louisville describes a
brighter future for felony probation, finding a rearrest rate of approximately 22% and that
most repeat offenses were not of the violent type. Vito, Felony Probation and Recidivism:
Replication and Response, 50 FED. PROBATION 17, 21-22 (Dec. 1986). The disparity in
recidivism findings is not unusual and the results should not be relied upon blindly.
Giving some credibility to the recidivism rates and recognizing the lack of funding for
probation programs, it should be realized that there is a severe crisis facing society-a
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Society's intolerance of deviant sexual behavior led to the belief that
sexual deviants must be institutionalized to protect the community.
Recent studies, however, indicate that sexual deviance may result from a
combination of biological and mental disorders.16 1 This discovery draws
into question the effectiveness of imprisoning such offenders. In light of
the evidence suggesting that prison neither deters nor rehabilitates
mentally disturbed sex offenders, 62 legal authorities have been forced to
consider alternatives such as probation with psychiatric therapy as a
condition.
As with most statistical studies, there is little agreement among
experts on whether sex offenders are serious recidivists. Early research
suggested that sex offenders did not have a tendency to repeat their
crimes. 63 However, there has been some doubt about the methodology of
these studies due to the fact that it is difficult not only to detect sexual
offenses but also to prosecute them.1 64 Turning to a recent study by
Romero and Williams, 65 it was found that of 231 men on intensive
probation supervision, some with psychiatric therapy and some without,
only 26 (11.3%) were rearrested for another sex offense.' 66 Interestingly,
pedophiles had the lowest recidivism rate of 6.2%.167 The most important
aspect of the study was the finding that group psychotherapy had an
insignificant effect on recidivism.168 This may indicate that probation is
not in itself a faulty concept but that the mode of treatment for sex
offenders may be to blame. However, in conflict with these research
findings, Freeman-Longo and Wall 169 estimate recidivism rates for un-
treated sex offenders to be between 35% and 80%.17o Given the state of
uncertainty in this area, the success of felony probation for sex offenders
is best characterized as having limited potential.
Further, in examining and understanding the potential for recidivism
failing prison system and a potentially unsuccessful probation system. The Rand study
suggests that the system lacks a spectrum of sanctions to match the spectrum of criminality.
Both studies recommend intensive surveillance programs as an option restrictive enough to
ensure public safety.
16 See Kopetski, Psychotherapy for People Who Molest Children, 13 COLO. LAW. 246, 250
(Feb. 1984).
162 Id.
1" Romero & Williams, Recidivism Among Sex Offenders: A 10-Year Followup Study, 49
FED. PROBATION 58 (Mar. 1985).
164 Id.
165 id.
166 Id. at 60.
167 Id.
16 Romero & Williams, Recidivism Among Sex Offenders: A 10-year Followup Study, 49
FED. PROBATION 58, 59 (Mar. 1985).
tca Freeman-Longo & Wall, Changing a Lifetime of Sexual Crime, PsyCHOLO TODAY 58
(Mar. 1986).
170 id.
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of pedophiles, it is essential to review the prominent causal theories and
prospects for rehabilitation. Many theories have been advanced in this
area, most identifying one or two mechanisms in order to explain the
phenomenon of sexual deviance. 17' The consensus seems to be that the
offenders themselves were victims of sexual abuse and trauma at one
time in their lives, somehow causing them to perpetuate such
behavior. 172 Moreover, existence of prior offenses in a child molester's
history is found to be the strongest indication of the likelihood of
re-offense. 173
Out of these theories and discoveries comes a common and uneasy
conclusion-there is no cure. Sexually deviant behavior is deeply in-
grained and most offenders need extensive treatment. 17 4 Thus, it is
extremely difficult to know what really is the best way to deal with sex
offenders and whether or not society should take the chance of putting
them back on the street.
Society, however much it desires, cannot put a child molester in a jail
and throw away the key. The sentencing structure, the crowded state of
prisons, and the lack of funding causes an attenuation of prison terms and
a decrease in the number of rehabilitative prison programs, thereby
putting untreated offenders back on the streets in a short period of time.
Furthermore, some studies have suggested that "for many offenders,
probation is likely to be at least as effective in preventing recidivism as
an institutional sentence."175 In short, the risks of both imprisonment
and probation are significant.
C. Rehabilitation
Whether warnings required on the front door of a residence and on both
car doors exclaiming "DANGEROUS SEX OFFENDER-NO CHIL-
DREN ALLOWED" have any positive effect on the risk of recidivism is
arguable. As stated earlier, the primary purpose of the majority of
probation statutes is rehabilitation. Accordingly, the Consuelo-Gonzalez
test requires that a probation condition must be reasonably related and
171 See S. ARAzi & D. FiNKELIOR, A SOuRcEaooK ON CHiLD SExuAL AusE 91-92 (1986).
172 id. at 102-04. Other theories identify as characteristic an unusual pattern of sexual
arousal toward children, a blocking of social and heterosexual relationships and that
alcohol is a disinhibiting factor. Id. at 117-18. Offenders are often found to have similar
personalities, developmental trauma, and psychological deficits. Brief for Appellee at 53,
Oregon v. Bateman, No. A44854 (Or. Ct. App. Nov. 1987).
73 S. ARAji & D. FINKELHOR, supra note 171, at 130-42.
174 Freeman-Longo & Wall, supra note 169, at 60. These researchers have found that
imprisonment or probation alone are not enough. They recommend an extensive inpatient
and outpatient program focusing upon "relapse prevention" by changing thought and
behavior patterns. Yet, they admit to a 50% drop-out rate and a 10% after-treatment
recidivism rate. Id.
175 R. HooD & R. SPARKS, supra note 148, at 186.
19881
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
contribute significantly to both the rehabilitation of the accused and the
protection of the public.176 Thus, to be valid, the scarlet letter condition
must aid in rehabilitating the offender, protect the public, and avoid
unnecessarily diminishing a constitutionally guaranteed right.17
7 If it
can be proven that the condition is narrowly tailored and has a rehabil-
itative and protective effect, it will be upheld by a reviewing court.
To decide if there is a rehabilitative purpose to the condition, it is
necessary to know how the courts define rehabilitation. Unfortunately,
there is no established definition among them, the result of which is a
very vague standard. 178 For this reason, few conditions are struck down
on rehabilitation grounds. Furthermore, only a few courts have articu-
lated any rehabilitative-related limitations on probation conditions. 179
There are three emerging methods of rehabilitation used most often by
the courts. They focus either upon "the offender's mental processes,
physical activity, or social situation."180 The first type is designed to
assist the offender in reforming the thinking patterns which engendered
the criminal behavior.' 8 ' The use of psychological counseling is the
favored means, especially for an offender whose crime was prompted by
mental health problems. The second method concentrates more closely
upon the physical activity involved in the crime. 8 2 For instance, drunk
drivers may be ordered to refrain from drinking. The third technique
attempts to achieve rehabilitation by manipulating or eliminating the
171 United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
177 id.
178 Some courts find that rehabilitation is accomplished by any condition which suffi-
ciently reforms the offender so that he will not repeat the crime. Russell v. State, 342 So. 2d
96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The ABA agrees with this approach stating that "conditions
imposed by the court should be designed to assist the probationer in leading a law-abiding
life." Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (quoting INST. JuD. ADMIN.,
Standards Relating to Probation, § 3.2(b) (1970)). Other courts seemingly require more from
a condition by defining rehabilitation as "the process of restoring an individual (as a convict,
mental patient or disaster victim) to a useful and constructive place in society through some
form of vocational, correctional, or therapeutic retraining or through relief, financial aid, or
other reconstructive measure." State v. Muggins, 192 Neb. 415, 420, 222 N.W.2d 289, 292
(1974). From these definitions it is easy to see how virtually any probation condition can be
justified.
"' In striking down a curfew condition, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found that "a
condition so harsh that the probationer is destined for failure" serves no purpose. State v.
Carey, 392 So. 2d 443 (La. 1981). The Fifth Circuit requires that probation conditions must
be "tailored to meet the special problems of particular offenders." Note, Judicial Review of
Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 187 (1967). Lastly, the leading California case
articulates the necessity that the condition be related to the crime, the criminal conduct,
and future criminality. People v. Dominguez, 256 Cal. App. 2d 623, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (1967).
1-0 CoHEN & GOSERT, supra note 10, at 183.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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social situation which was thought to prompt the criminal activity.1s 3 As
with the first method, these conditions appear targeted at the origins of
the criminal activity and not just the activity itself. Limits on the
offender's physical location and association with persons likely to encour-
age crimes are the most frequent examples of this technique.
At first glance, the scarlet letter probation condition seems to fall
within the third method; however, further examination proves that it is
quite different. As with most of these types of conditions, its aim is to
keep the offender away from a situation which may tempt him into
committing the same or similar crimes. The difference lies with the fact
that unlike most disassociation cases, the offender is not merely someone
who made a bad decision but someone who is psychologically deviant;
those who he must avoid are to be regarded not as troublemakers but as
innocent victims. As such, the condition's primary concern is not with the
probationer's rehabilitation but with protection of children and punish-
ment of the offender. Thus, the condition treats the symptoms rather than
the causes.
Although it is clear that curing a repeat sex offender is a difficult, if not
impossible task, the use of warnings can hardly be characterized as an
effort to reform his behavior. The root of a child molester's problems are
psychological and recidivism is highly possible. In order to halt the
criminal behavior, it is critical to treat him in a medical setting. A more
logical, scientific and narrowly-tailored approach would be to place him
in an intensive probation supervision program requiring fulltime
therapy.18 4 If the end to be reached is to create a law-abiding citizen,
scarlet letter conditions are not the appropriate means.
Furthermore, the third method is traditionally used to make it easier
on the probationer to live a normal lifestyle encouraging healthy activ-
ities such as a career and respectable friendships. A dangerous sex
offender warning requirement can hardly be said to accomplish this
objective. Employment, housing and friends will be extremely difficult to
acquire and maintain. A normal lifestyle is impossible with signs to
constantly warn the general public and the offender that he is far from
the average human being. The task of learning how to live decently and
harmoniously in society will become frustrating and even psychologically
harmful. Such a condition may backfire and actually encourage the
deviant behavior due to a child molester's low tolerance for stress. Given
its harshness, he is destined for failure and compliance then becomes the
sole aim. Even though the court in Goldschmitt'8 5 found it healthy for a
183 Id.
184 For an excellent explanation and evaluation of intensive supervision programs across
the country, see Byrne, The Control Controversy: A Preliminary Examination of Intensive
Probation Supervision Programs in the United States, 50 FED. PROBATION 4 (June 1986).
185 Goldschmitt v. Florida, 490 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
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convicted drunk driver to be constantly reminded through a bumper
sticker that his behavior was legally and socially wrong, they were
dealing with a relatively healthy person capable of understanding right
from wrong. In addition, the bumper sticker is unlikely to have an effect
upon any major aspects of the offender's life given the general em-
pathetic attitude of society toward drinking and driving. Hence, the cases
are easily distinguished and it is not difficult to recognize the risks
of a scarlet letter condition in such a volatile situation as the one at
hand.
D. Protection
If this probation condition cannot be justified upon rehabilitative
grounds, it is unlikely to withstand review, even if it can be said to
protect the public. A rehabilitative effect should intrinsically discourage
the child molester's tendencies and in this way the rehabilitative and
protective objectives become linked. If the condition does not rehabilitate,
it will have little chance at assisting the accused in making the correct
decision when faced with a threatening situation. His compulsive behav-
ior remains unchanged and the warning signs will not be enough to
curtail him.
Assuming arguendo that the condition has some rehabilitative
attributes, the next step is to determine whether it really results in
protection of children. If all parents were diligent enough to teach their
children to stay away from over-friendly men and houses and cars with
sex offender signs on them, it could be said to accomplish its goal.
However, all parents do not take the time to educate their children.
Furthermore, children who cannot yet read will be unable to distinguish
between what is and is not a warning sign; for instance, many cars have
advertising signs on their doors. Parents cannot accompany their
children and protect them at all times. Nor do many children follow or
understand all instructions they are given so that even if they are aware
of the danger or are able to read, we cannot be sure they will be
protected. Child molesters are creative and able to design innovative
methods to lure children into their net. In this situation, if he is
determined, all he need do is walk down the street and become
anonymous. Furthermore, if there is any protective element to the
probation condition, it is extinguished when the probation term ends.
Thus, the condition fails the protective part of the test. The test should
have been tailored more closely to those it was trying to protect. Since
children are so vulnerable and an untreated child molester so dangerous,
the only solution would be to professionally educate the children and
enroll the offender in an intensive probation supervision program so
that he may be monitored at all times while receiving rehabilitative
therapy.
[Vol. 36:613
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss4/18
SCARLET LETTER PUNISHMENT
E. Punishment
The condition of probation requiring signs to be posted on the convict's
door is reflective of the exposure type of punishments condemned many
years ago. These punishments include such things as simple exposure,
the pillory and branding.e 6 The main purpose of these punishments was
to identify and humiliate the offender so that he would always carry with
him a badge of shame.'8 7 Likening the punishments to amputations, one
commentator has described them as exemplary and reflective.1ss The
foremost justifications for such reflective punishments are deterrence,
protection of the public, and vengeance.189 Most important is the recog-
nition that "rehabilitation and reform seem[ ] to be contradicted by the
penalty itself. Rehabilitation, making a man whole, is literally foreclosed
by the punishment." 190
The scarlet letter condition of probation is easily identified with the
described punishments. Accordingly, its purpose is also to punish by
humiliation and degradation. The progression away from the underpin-
nings of such punishments exemplifies society's distaste with humiliation
as a sole justification. Society has for centuries regarded this attitude
toward punishment as uncivilized. Yet, today we are faced with a
probation condition which is indistinguishable in both form and motive
from those primitive punishments we have proscribed. Maybe the Indi-
ana Supreme Court was wrong in 1893 when it declared that the phrase
"cruel and unusual" was a prohibition intended to forbid excesses which
"were of a time far from which our civilization has grown."' 91
From an historical perspective, it is apparent that the scarlet letter
condition has a purposeful and deep punitive effect. However, courts have
l"6 In cases of simple exposure, offenders were often shown to the town with an object
reflecting their crime. The most common object used was a notice attached to the prisoner's
breast with the offense for which he was punished written on it. A pillory was a miniscaffold
attached to the wall of the town hall. It allowed the offender to be exposed to the public so
that they may participate in the punishment by throwing rotten fruit, mud, or dung at him.
An extremely severe punishment was that of branding which stigmatized its bearer as a
person who had once mounted a scaffold. Branding began by marking or scaring someone on
an exposed area such as the face or shoulder but gradually changed to less visible marks on
the ear or ball of the thumb. Interestingly, "[tlhe gradual change from more visible marks
to less visible ones implies a slight increase or revulsion towards this penalty, because the
result of branding was made less public." P. Sptssaauao, THE SPECTACLE OF SUFFERING 69-70
(1984).
187 Id.
"' Forte, Islamic Law and the Crime of Theft: An Introduction, 34 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 51-53
(1985-86).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 52.
'9' State v. Hobbs, 133 Ind. 404, 409, 32 N.E. 1019, 1021 (Ind. 1893). "[A]n assessment of
contemporary values... is relevant to the application of the Eighth Amendment." Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
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found that, as a primary purpose of a condition, a punitive effect is
impermissible.192 After concluding in the past analysis that this condi-
tion is neither rehabilitative nor protective, it is difficult to rationalize
that its primary purpose is anything but punitive. 193 The imposition of
such a condition is something that the desperate situation of the prison
system cannot justify.
IV. CONCLUSION
A scarlet letter probation condition fails in both the constitutional and
criminal law areas. It sufficiently abridges some of the probationer's
constitutional rights, at the least to subject it to special scrutiny, if not to
completely invalidate it. Further, the probation condition by its nature
neither rehabilitates the offender nor protects the public. A child mo-
lester is not merely a criminal who knows that he is doing wrong, he is a
mentally ill sex offender. As such, the requirement for signs on his doors
has no rehabilitative benefit. In fact, it may achieve just the opposite,
pushing the offender further into a criminal lifestyle. In addition,
protection of the public is a worthy but illogical objective, since the
victims are innocent children not knowledgeable adults, the signs are
temporary, and the molester can still become anonymous.
The scarlet letter punishment has not been used for many years due to
its humiliating nature. Since the motivation for its use today as a
probation condition is identical, the condition is impermissible. Further-
more, the overcrowded state of prisons cannot be the sole ground for its
justification. If this were so, any tortuous penalty would be allowable.
However, the solution in a case like Mr. Bateman's is difficult to
formulate. Under the current state of knowledge, sex offenders should be
given the potential benefits of scientifically-tailored programs and inten-
sively monitored supervision in a hospital-type setting. In the long-term
and on a broader basis, society, the justice system, and the legislatures
are going to have to explore, with greater enthusiasm, legitimate
alternatives to incarceration which may be utilized so that prison space
can be reserved for violent criminals. If this message is not received and
effectively responded to, significant erosion of our criminal justice system
is inevitable.
LEONORE H. TAVILL
192 See Higdon v. United States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980); Logan v. People, 332
P.2d 897 (Colo. 1958); Kominsky v. State, 330 So. 2d 800 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
193 The trial record reflective of the punitive motivation of the judge in imposing the
sentence. Speaking of child molesters, the court stated: "It is my feeling that we should
probably dye them green, or something.... Record at 15-18, Bateman (No. C 85-10-34220).
[Vol. 36:613
32https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol36/iss4/18
